This paper deals with optimal taxation in a two-class economy with two private commodities and labour. We derive optimal nonlinear income and linear commodity taxes in the presence of merit goods. We formulate merit good arguments via a pathology of individual choice. We assume weak separability between consumption and leisure and show that the standard optimal tax results are modiøed due to merit good considerations. We ørst ønd a subsidy on the merit good. Secondly, optimal income marginal tax rates are also shown to dioeer from the standard literature: it is positive on high-ability individuals and on low-ability individuals it is ambiguous because of a dampening eoeect due to merit good considerations. Finally, we derive the eoeective marginal tax rates.
Introduction
The inability of the government to observe individual characteristics -in particular, ability-has given rise to an important number of papers that deal with optimal taxation in second-best frameworks. Several authors have concentrated attention on either direct or indirect taxation. Nevertheless, there has also been interest in the mixed tax case (Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) , Mirrlees (1976) ). One of the most interesting propositions in this øeld establishes that ıif the utility is weakly separable between labor and all consumption goods (taken together), then no commodity taxation need be employed (Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) , p.64). However, the observed coexistence of direct and indirect taxation in reality has led several authors to challenge this result. This paper provides an alternative objection to it through the introduction of merit good considerations.
We address this issue in a ønite-class economy because we believe this kind of setting allows for highly intuitive results. The main contribution to the optimal tax mix in a two-class economy was made by Stiglitz (1982) with both non-linear commodity and income taxation. The case of non-linear income and linear commodity taxation has been recently re-examined in this kind of setting by Edwards et al. (1994) and Nava et al. (1996) . Our model is similar to the one deployed in Nava et al. (1996) . Like them, we consider a standard two-person model of optimal taxation where the government cannot observe the agents' ability and uses both non-linear income and linear commodity taxes for redistribution. Unlike them, we allow for merit good considerations.
The notion of merit goods was ørst suggested by Musgrave (1959) and since then it has been given dioeerent interpretations. However, most of them relate to situations where the social evaluation of a good derives not simply from the norm of consumer sovereignty but implies that individual preferences are either neglected or supplemented by other considerations. This means to some extent imposing on individuals choices that they would not otherwise make. Examples of this kind of policies are not diOEcult to ønd in reality: from compulsory education (a case of merit goods) to the restriction of drug use (a case of demerit goods). However, the analytical treatment of this class of goods has been scarce. Just a few papers have tried to incorporate this kind of considerations in models of optimal øscal policy (Pazner (1972) , Sandmo (1983) , Besley (1988) ). In particular, Besley (1988) introduces a kind of merit good arguments for intervention called defective preference arguments (i.e., based on a pathology of individual choice). He examines a way of representing merit goods by allowing governments to apply a speciøc form of correction to consumers' preferences.
We adopt a particular formulation of the defective preferences approach inspired by a recent trend in health research devoted to healthpromotion . According to this view, there are certain goods (food, water, electricity, etc.) that could have positive eoeects on health and whose consumption should be encouraged. In the developing countries, where the levels of consumption and quality of such goods are very low, little improvements in the quantity and quality could have large positive eoeects on health, even higher than the eoeects of the traditional medical care. In the developed ones the levels of consumption and quality of them are already high so one could think that the problem is not such an interesting one. Nevertheless, we argue that it deserves some attention since in the presence of income inequalities there could be people that cannot aoeord an adequate level of consumption of such goods. The merit good argument proceed via a divergence between individual and government preferences on these goods. We assume that individuals take into account the eoeect of these goods on their utility, but they do not care about their additional positive eoeect on health.
We show that the standard results on both commodity and income taxation are modiøed by the introduction of these merit good considerations. First, we ønd that a subsidy on the merit good is optimal under the assumption of weak separability between consumption and leisure. This subsidy is decomposed into an average and a covariance term to analyze the forces determining the magnitude of the subsidy. It is shown that the subsidy is higher the lower the resulting gap between the merit good consumption of high and low ability individuals, and viceversa.. Moreover, optimal marginal income tax rates are also shown to dioeer from those in the standard literature: the marginal tax rate on high-income individuals is now positive and for low-ability individuals there appears an additional term due to merit good considerations which have a dampening eoeect on the marginal tax rate.. Finally, marginal eoeective tax rates are also derived in order to combine commodity and income marginal tax results.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we describe the model and derive the optimal policy rules. We discuss them in section 3 (optimal linear indirect taxation) and section 4 (optimal marginal income tax rates), under the assumption of weak separability between labour (leisure) and commodities. In section 5 we derive the marginal eoeective tax rates for both individuals, also for the weak separability case. We draw some conclusions in section 6.
The model
We consider a production economy with two types of individuals: n 1 workers with low ability (i = 1) and n 2 workers with high ability (i = 2) providing respectively w 1 and w 2 eOEciency units per hour of labour (where
The utility function U(.) is monotonous and strictly concave, it is deøned over the amounts of foregone leisure (l ) and of two private commodities (x a and x b ) and it is the same for all the agents. We will assume that the marginal rate of substitution of commodity a for leisure is a increasing function of foregone leisure (which would guarantee normality of a in a one-commodity framework) 1 :
Assumption N :
Without loss of generality, we assume that each of the goods costs one unit of eOEciency labour to produce. We can therefore normalize the producer price of both private goods to unity. The real wage rate for a member of class i is then given and coincides with w i (i = 1, 2).
The government cannot observe individuals' ability, which is private information, but it does observe gross income. In such a context, it has been shown that when private commodities can be retraded easily the best way to attain a more equal welfare distribution would be by imposing non-linear income taxes and linear commodity taxation to avoid arbitrage opportunities.
The modelization of non-linear income taxation follows from Nava et al. (1996) . An individual of type i who faces an arbitrary non-linear income tax schedule will choose a point on it through her optimal choice of labour supply. A virtual budget constraint can be deøned by linearizing the aftertax budget constraint. A marginal income tax rate, t i , and a lump sum component, T i , both unique to the agent, will be associated to each virtual budget line. The pair (t i ,T i ) therefore denotes the taxtreatment of gross labour income of a type i agent. Like them, we will work with two virtual budget constraints (one for each type i agent) and allow the government to choose individual-speciøc income tax treatments. These income tax treatments must satisfy the appropriate self-selection constraints (i.e. no agent of one type should have an incentive to apply for the income tax treatment designed for agents of the other type). Once the two optimal virtual budget lines are found, a non linear income tax schedule can be adjusted to induce agents to self-select their optimal allocations.
An individual of type i therefore faces the income tax treatment (t i ,T i ) and the marginal commodity tax rates τ a and τ b . She solves the following problem:
where q a and q b represent consumer prices of commodities a and b, respectively. They equal producer prices plus commodity taxes (q c = 1 + τ c , c = a, b). Given that the production sector is competitive and, thus, proøt income is zero, it is possible to normalize one commodity tax rate to zero. We will choose τ a = 0 so that q a = p a = 1. Therefore, commodity a will hereafter denote the numeraire.
The ørst order conditions of problem (?? ) lead to the demand and supply functions
The following expressions represent how this indirect utility is aoeected by changes in the tax policy:
where α i denotes agent i 's marginal utility of income.
Let us deøne a mimicking agent (or mimicker) as an agent of type 2 who applies for the income tax treatment designed for type 1 agents 2 . In order to mimic the pre-tax income of individual 1, which is given by w 1 l 1 , the mimicker must supply a quantity of labourl 2 = w 1 l 1 /w 2 (from now on, all the variables related to the mimicker will be written with a hat). Given that the amount of labour has to be equal tol 2 , the mimicking agent can only choose consumption of commodities a and b to maximize her utility:
From the ørst order conditions of this maximization we obtain the demand functions
; l 2 and the indirect utility function:
The eoeects of tax changes on it are given by:
whereα 2 stands for the mimicking agent's marginal utility of income and
ξ represents the dioeerence between the implicit marginal income tax rate which induces the mimicker to providel 2 hours of labour (i.e., 1 + Ul/αw 2 ) and the nominal tax rate t 1 . ξ will in general be dioeerent from zero since the mimicker, in order to apply for individual 1 tax treatment, must supply an exogenously determined suboptimal level of labour. Assumption N suOEces for ξ to be positive 3 .
The government chooses the tax policy to maximize a utilitarian social welfare function which dioeers from the usual sum of individual utilities in that it incorporates merit good considerations. As we have already noted in the introduction, we adopt a particular formulation of the defective preference arguments approach to deal with some issues in health promotion. There are certain goods that could have a positive eoeect on health and whose consumption should be encouraged. The merit good argument proceeds via a divergence between individual and government preferences on them. Individuals take into account the eoeect of these goods on their utility function. However, we assume that they do not care about their additional positive eoeect on health, while government does. Formally, we choose to express this divergence by the following equation:
where U g (.) represents government's preferences and U (.) stands for individual's preferences. h x i b denotes the health function which depends positively on the consumption of commodity b and it is monotonous and strictly concave (i.e., ∂h/∂x i b > 0 and ∂ 2 h/∂x i b 2 < 0). The reason underlying these assumptions on the shape of the health function relates to the highly probable decreasing marginal eoeect of commodity b on health. The social welfare function considered by the government is, therefore:
The government cannot observe individuals' abilities, but it does observe the level of gross income, and solves the following program:
The ørst constraint is a self-selection condition on high ability agents which we will assume to be binding. Its associated Lagrange multiplier will then take a strictly positive value. And the second condition is the government budget constraint. Its associated Lagrange multiplier will be positive due to monotonicity of preferences.
Manipulations of the ørst order conditions of problem (?? ) with respect to τ b , t 1 , T 1 , t 2 , T 2 lead to 4 :
A tilde over a variable stands for a compensated eoeect 5 . Moreover, the compensated eoeect in equation (?? ) is deøned as:
4 The ørst order conditions (foc) of (8) are obtained by equating to zero the derivatives of the associated Lagrangian w.r.t. the øve decision variables. Then, we proceed to the standard manipulations, similar to that performed in Nava et al. (1996) 
Simple rearrangements lead to (9), (10) and (11). 5 These compensated eoeects follow from Slutsky equations:
where a change in τ b is combined with a change in t i such that labour supply remains constant. Nava et al. (1996) show that this labour-constrained compensated eoeect 6 is strictly negative under a strongly quasi-concave (and, thus, under a strictly concave) utility function.
At this point we need to explain the rationale for the presence of these labour-constrained compensated eoeects in the present context. The standard modelization of the non-linear income tax schedule in the quantity space (for instance, Stiglitz (1982 Stiglitz ( , 1987 ) creates two distinct combinations of gross and disposable income available. In the present modelization, this is done by the virtual budget constraints together with the self-selection constraints. When an agent is faced with the dioeerent tax treatments designed by the government for the dioeerent ability groups, her choice between them is a non-marginal one. When the indirect tax system is marginally changed, the agent is not able to react by a marginal adjustment of her labour supply. Hence, the reallocation of a mimicker's disposable income will be as if subject to a labour supply quantity constraint.
Optimal linear indirect taxation
The term
) represents the amount of commodity b which the mimicker consumes in excess of a type 1 agent. On the one hand, both agents earn the same gross income and face therefore the same amount of disposable income. On the other hand, the mimicker will enjoy, however, a larger amount of leisure due to her higher ability. This might induce her to allocate her disposable income dioeerently from individual 1. The following deønition involves this idea.
Deønition [Nava et al. (1996) ]: Assume both an exogenous amount of disposable income and leisure are allocated to a consumer. A commodity is then said to be an l-complement (l-substitute) with leisure when that commodity is consumed in a larger (smaller) amount as more leisure becomes available.
It follows that a commodity will be l -independent with leisure when its level 6 The compensated price eoeect deøned in (12) is derived using the tools of Neary and Roberts (1980) : it denotes the (own) compensated price eoeect on the merit good when there exists a quantity constraint in the labour market.
of consumption does not change as more leisure becomes available. It can be easily shown that Hicksian substitutability of commodity b with leisure (∂x b /∂t < 0) is a necessary condition for commodity b being l -independent with leisure when both commodities are assumed to be normal 7 .
Unlike Nava et al. (1996) , we will assume l -independence with leisure (i.e., weak separability between consumption and leisure) to focus on the eoeect of merit good considerations on optimal tax policies. Under weak separability between consumption and leisure,x 2 b = x 1 b . In words, the amount of commodity b consumed by the mimicker and by a type 1 agent will be the same since they have the same disposable income and the allocation of it over the commodities will be independent of the amount of leisure they enjoy. Then, the optimal consumption tax rate for the weak separability case is:
It can be easily shown that τ b < 0 (i.e. a subsidy on the merit good). The existence of a subsidy follows directly from the aim of the government of rising the level of health through encouraging the consumption of commodity b.
However, in order to obtain more insights from this result, it is useful to work with the optimal commodity tax expression to separate an average and a covariance eoeect. With this objective in mind we make use of the following identity:
where: Nava et al. (1996) , in their Appendix B, use the tools deployed in Neary and Roberts (1980) to relate their commodity classiøcation to standard income and substitution eoeects. They show that, under the normality of both private commodities, the Hicksian complementarity of the non-numeraire with leisure is a suOEcient condition for this commodity to be an l-complement with leisure. The role of Hicksian substitability/complementarity was also analyzed previously by Christiansen (1984, section 6) .
is the average of the marginal eoeects of the merit good on health. The optimal commodity tax can therefore be rewritten as follows:
where:
are the average and the absolute value, respectively, of the labour-constrained compensated eoeect.
We can distinguish two main determinants of the magnitude of the subsidy. First, we have the average of the marginal eoeects of commodity b on health. The higher it is, the higher the subsidy. Given the characteristics of the health function, the marginal eoeect of commodity b on health will be higher either when the quantity of x b being consumed is very low or because health is highly correlated with commodity b and there is much to be gained by its subsidization.
Secondly, we have the covariance between the marginal eoeect of commodity b on health and the absolute value of the labour-constrained compensated eoeect. This covariance represents the dispersion of the marginal eoeects of the merit good on health among people with dioeerent income. The higher this covariance term, the higher the subsidy. If x b is a normal good and if the individual with higher ability have both higher pre-and post-tax income, then
Taking into account the properties of the health function we obtain the following equivalence:
Hence, the sign and magnitude of the covariance depends on the relationship between the labour-constrained (own) compensated price eoeect on the merit good for individuals of dioeerent abilities (i.e. on the relative sensitivity of the merit good consumption to its subsidy by individuals of dioeerent abilities). In particular, if low-ability individuals are more sensitive to the subsidy and increase the consumption of commodity b when subsidized by more than high-ability individuals do, the subsidy will be higher. And the subsidy will be lower in the opposite case (when high-ability individuals increase the consumption of commodity b more than low-ability individuals).
It should be noted that in the ørst case the gap between the consumption of high-and low-ability individuals decreases and it is more interesting to subsidize, while in the second case the gap increases and it is less interesting to do it.
It seems interesting to recall at this point that in the present model there are two constraints that generate a second-best problem: i) the self-selection constraint (due to the fact that the government is unable to observe the individuals' ability), and ii) the restriction that the commodity tax cannot be individualised (due to the fact that the commodities are easily retradeable). The merit good has a positive marginal eoeect on health. However, this marginal eoeect is decreasing (which is represented by the concavity of the health function). The sign of the commodity tax rate (i.e. the existence of a subsidy) follows immediately from the aim of the government of rising the level of health through encouraging the consumption of the merit good. The magnitude of the subsidy will depend on the way the subsidy aoeects the quantity consumed by individuals of dioeerent abilities. Since the government is restricted to impose a single subsidy rate across consumers, one person (presumably the high-ability individual) will be oversubsidized and overconsume the merit good and the other person will be undersubsidized and underconsume the merit good 8 . The subsidy will be higher when both the overconsumption by high-ability individuals and underconsumption by low-ability individuals are low (i.e. the gap between consumption of highand low-ability individuals is smaller), and viceversa. In other words, the subsidy will be higher when the ineOEciency loss due to the existence of a single commodity tax (subsidy) rate across consumers is low, and viceversa.
Optimal marginal income tax rates
Under weak separability between consumption and leisure the optimal marginal income tax rate on high-ability individuals is given by:
which is obtained from the combination of (?? ) and (?? ). We have already noted that Hicksian substitutability of commodity b with leisure (∂x b /∂t < 0) is a necessary condition for commodity b being l -independent with leisure when both commodities are assumed to be normal. Using this, we have that
The optimal marginal income tax rate on low-ability individuals under the weak separability assumption is given by:
which is obtained from the combination of (?? ) and (?? ). Given that the second term in the RHS of equation (?? ) is the equivalent for individual 1 of the RHS of equation (?? ), it can be shown that under the same assumptions it will be negative. Given that the ørst term in the RHS is positive, the sign of the marginal income tax rate on low-ability individuals is, therefore, ambiguous. Stiglitz (1982 Stiglitz ( , 1987 shows that a zero marginal income tax rate should be levied on high-ability individuals while the low-ability individuals' income need be taxed at the margin because of the self-selection constraint. He remarks that there is a distortionassociated with redistributing any signiøcant amount of resources from the more able to the less able. This distortion arises from the self-selection constraint. When merit good considerations are taken into account the results are modiøed. Marginal income tax rates on high-ability individuals are now positive. For low ability individuals, the standard reason for positive distortionary taxation still applies. This standard reason, represented by the positive ørst RHS term of (16) , is that a positive marginal income tax rate on low-ability individuals decreases the incentive of high-ability individuals to masquerade as lowability individuals. However, there is an additional second RHS term, due to merit good considerations, which has a dampening eoeect on the marginal tax rate.
The intuition for a positive distortionary tax on high-ability individuals' income in the present context is the following: since these individuals' consumption of the merit good is oversubsidized, a disincentive to supply labour (and exchange leisure for further overconsumption) is justiøed. For low-ability individuals who are underconsuming the merit good, the correction term has the opposite sign. These results are due to the fact that the government is restricted to impose a single commodity tax (subsidy) rate across consumers 9 . We can relate this to the literature on direct and indirect correcting taxes on externalities. When direct taxes on the merit good (in our case, commodity taxation) are restricted to be uniform the extra instrument of an indirect tax on the merit good (in our case, income taxation) is justiøed. In the present model the non-linear income taxation is then both used for redistribution (as in the standard literature) and as an indirect correcting tax on the merit good.
It is also possible to decompose the merit good eoeect on marginal income tax rates into two sub eoeects: (a) the gap between the marginal eoeect of commodity b on type i individuals' health and the average of marginal eoeects in the economy, and (b) a covariance term.
With this objective in mind, we can rewrite income tax rates as follows:
The forces that were shown to determine the magnitude of the subsidy on the merit good are also present in the case of marginal income tax rates. First, the bigger the gap between the marginal eoeect of the merit good on type i individuals' health and the average of marginal eoeects in the economy, the higher the dioeerence of marginal income tax rates for individual i with respect to a non-merit good situation. For instance, the marginal tax rate on high-ability individuals will be much higher and the marginal tax rate on low-ability individuals will be much lower than in Stiglitz (1982) . For high ability individuals, if the marginal eoeect of commodity b on their health is much smaller than the average, this means that they are already consuming a lot and the marginal income tax rate will be much higher in the presence of merit good considerations. For low ability individuals, if the marginal eoeect of commodity b on their health is much higher than the average, this means they are not consuming enough and the marginal income tax rate will be much smaller. Secondly, a higher covariance raises both high-and low-ability individuals' marginal income tax rates. If we join this to the results in the previous section, a higher (lower) covariance implies both a higher (lower) subsidy and higher (lower) marginal income tax rates for both high-and low-ability individuals.
5 The marginal eoeective tax rate Edwards et al. (1994) establish what they believe a neglected result: ıPareto eOEciency requires that the eoeective marginal rate of tax on the highest earner -the change in total payments of both income and commodity taxes consequent on an additional $1 of earnings-be zero , a result they argue to be dioeerent from other and more familiar end-point results in optimal taxation.
The concept of marginal eoeective tax rate seems interesting when dealing with optimal tax mix problems since it combines both direct and indirect marginal tax rates. We therefore derive the eoeective marginal tax rates for both individuals 1 and 2 in our case. Let Ψ (y i ) be the total tax paid at
Then, the marginal eoeective tax rate will be:
In our case the marginal eoeective tax rate on high-ability individuals will be given by:
so that sign (Ψ (y 2 )) = sign ∂x 2 b /∂t 2 . If commodity b is Hicksian substitute with leisure (which is a necessary condition for commodity b being l -independent with leisure), the marginal eoeective tax rate on individual 2 is negative. The magnitude is determined by the higher or lower marginal eoeect of the merit good on high-ability individual's health. For low-ability individuals we will have:
The ørst term in (?? ) is positive (because of the standard reason for positive distortionary income taxation on the low-ability individual) while the second term is negative under the assumption of Hicksian substitutability with leisure. This second term is due to the introduction of merit good considerations and its magnitude is determined by the higher or lower marginal eoeect of the merit good on health. The sign of the marginal eoeective tax rate for low-ability individuals is, nevertheless, ambiguous although it could be expected to be, in general, lower than in the standard literature.
The eoeective marginal tax rates combine the previous results on commodity and income taxation. Recall that, as far as indirect taxation was concerned, we found a subsidy on the merit good. As to direct taxation, we found a positive marginal tax rate on high-ability individuals and for low-ability individuals there was a dampening eoeect on the tax rate due to the merit good. By combining both commodity and income taxation into eoeective marginal tax rates we have found a negative eoeective marginal tax rate on high-ability individuals and an ambiguous, although possibly smaller than in the standard literature, eoeective marginal tax rate on low-ability individuals.
Conclusions
In this paper we have introduced merit good considerations into an optimal tax mix problem. We have considered a two-class economy with two private commodities and labour in which linear commodity and non-linear income taxation were used both for redistribution and for merit good concerns. We have modeled merit goods in the spirit of the defective preference arguments approach deployed in Besley (1988) . The speciøc formulation we have used was inspired by some issues in health promotion.
We have assumed weak separability between consumption and leisure to focus on the eoeects of merit good considerations on optimal tax policies. We ørst found a subsidy on the merit good. The existence of a subsidy follows directly from the aim of the government of rising the level of health through encouraging the consumption of the merit good. The magnitude of the subsidy was shown to depend on the way the subsidy aoeects the quantity consumed by individuals of dioeerent abilities. Since the government is restricted to impose a subsidy rate across consumers, the high-ability individual will be oversubsidized and overconsume the merit good and the low-ability individual will be undersubsidized and underconsume the merit good. The subsidy has been shown to be higher when the ineOEciency loss due to the existence of a uniform commodity tax rate across consumers is low, and viceversa. As for marginal income tax rates, we have shown that they are positive on high-ability individuals and ambiguous on low-ability individuals. There is the standard reason for positive distortionary income taxation on the low-ability individual, as long as it decreases the incentive of high-ability individuals to masquerade as low-ability individuals, but also a dampening eoeect due to merit good concerns. Since high-income individuals' consumption of the merit good is oversubsidized, a disincentive to supply labour (and exchange leisure for further overconsumption) is justiøed. For low-ability individuals who are underconsuming the merit good, the correction term has the opposite sign. Finally, we derived eoeective marginal tax rates in order to combine the commodity and income taxation results. They were shown to be negative on high-ability individuals and ambiguous, although possibly smaller than in the standard literature, on low-ability individuals.
